Monday, January 24, 2011
TURNING THE TIDE: ENABLING POVERTY REDUCTION
Tuesday, January 18, 2011
India: Microfinance and Its Emerging Challenges
Perspectives on the SHGs
that the democratic movement and its organizations were not only forced to take this development seriously, but also develop their own perspective on SHG formation, while recognizing the limitation of the neo-liberal model of microfinance. The main critique of the neo-liberal model was built around the fact that it was largely designed to mobilize the savings of the poor for providing liquidity to banks and also for mobilizing the savings for self-employment programs in which the government had started to invest less and less money. In this situation, the formation of the SHGs was becoming a way of absolving the state of its own responsibility towards poverty alleviation programs. At the same time, many communal organizations and profit seeking commercial enterprises had also started to use these SHGs for their own narrow ends.
In stark contrast to this, the alternative perspective of the Left led governments saw the SHGs as a way of increasing the outreach of the government as well as channelling the government funds to the people. For example, the Kutumbashree, neighborhood micro-credit program of the Kerala government, linked the panchayat development with the organization and livelihood security of women. In West Bengal too, SHGs were given loans at subsidized, low interest rates, and they also received adequate training and marketing support. This showed that the democratic movement’s model of SHGs was concentrated on the democratization of governance rather than on the withdrawal of government support. By the same measure, democratic organizations working for women’s rights saw the formation of SHGs (for instance, MALAR federation in Tamilnadu) as providing a window of opportunity to mobilize women on social, economic and political issues.
Roots of the Rise of MFIs
The recent rise and growth of micro finance institutions has only made such SHGs all the more vulnerable in the present scenario of economic distress. According to the State of the Microfinance Sector report of the ACCESS alliance, the MFI operations expanded by 13 times in four years to end the year 2009 at Rs 117.9 billion ($2.6 billion) in outstanding loans. Of its 26.6 million borrowers, poor women and disadvantaged sections form one of the largest sections of the clientele. Whereas there was only one for-profit MFI in the country in the middle of the 1990s, this number had spiraled to 149 registered micro finance institutions by 2009. Of these, about 11 per cent of the large micro finance companies had a disproportionally larger share in the credit market, having 82 percent of the clients and controlling about 88 per cent of the loan portfolio. This reveals the emergence of new corporate entities and private finance companies who have started to exploit the credit needs of the poor by charging high interest rates. An investigation by a report from the Down to Earth magazine in Andhra Pradesh revealed that whereas bank linked self-help groups were charging interest rates of about 15 percent from their borrowers, the interest rates charged by the MFIs were at about 60 per cent. This clearly showed that a space had been created for exploitative financial intermediaries for entering the rural and urban credit markets.
That this phenomenon was linked to the refusal of public sector banks and the state to extend the outreach of its formal credit infrastructure is evident from the fact that most of the MFIs are concentrated in the 256 districts where the poor have a demand for credit, but the formal banking system is not able to meet this demand. Of this Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka have the greatest density of micro finance institutions, and more than 50 percent of the outstanding loans are in the southern states.
This meteoric rise of the MFIs has its roots in the liberalization of the banking system and its failure to meet the demands of the rural poor, especially women. Initially the MFIs were started in response to the program of financial inclusion. The SHG-bank linkage program was started by the National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD) where non-government organizations (NGOs) and not-for-profit institutions played an intermediary role in promoting and facilitating the link between self-help groups and banks. Thus many MFIs started as not-for-profit NGOs and then began to expand their operations to make direct contact with the clients. Thus SKS Microfinance (which is the largest MFI in the country today) started as a not-for-profit institution and converted itself into a non-banking financial company in 2004. Similarly, Sampdana, another of the MFI giants, started with 500 clients and increased its clientele to about 3 lakh (300,000) in the period between 1998 and 2004 when it became another for-profit company. This conversion of not-for-profit institutions into MFIs was a result of a state policy that increasingly facilitated the penetration of big private capital in this sector. International institutions like the World Bank supported the funders of the MFIs like Basix and the NGOs like PRADAN and SEWA in order to facilitate the demise of public sector banking.
Weakness of the Neoliberal Model
Such policies only exposed the weakness and inability of the current government and bank driven programs to meet these challenges. Women participating in the bank linkage program faced difficulties in getting access to bank credit despite the fact that it is they who had formed the SHGs. Thus around one lakh SHGs under the bank linkage scheme are yet to be credit linked even though they have formed the group under the linkage scheme. Further, the bank linkage scheme itself operates in two ways: first where the SHGs are supported directly through the banks on the one hand and, second, where banks lend to the MFIs for onward lending to the SHGs. They believe that this will only increase their outreach. But it is precisely this strategy which has also created the space for a replacement of the banks with the MFIs in some regions. Thus NABARD’s own report on the Status of Microfinance, 2009-2010 shows that while the rate of growth of direct bank support to the MFIs went up by 8.1 percent during the last year, direct support to the SHGs only went up by around six percent. This shows that the banks found it easier to give bulk loans to the MFIs rather than strengthen their direct links with the SHGs. Further, the ACCESS alliance report shows that the operation of the MFIs expanded by 83 percent in the last two years whereas the expansion of banking operations was only half that rate. This shows that the roots of rise of the MFIs lie in the slow growth of public sector banking and their reluctant and tenuous links with the SHGs.
The second important factor that led to the rise of the MFIs was the failure of the poverty alleviation programs that relied on the SHGs as the main mobilization strategy. The Andhra example is well known in this regard. Here the withdrawal of low interest rate based self-employment programs has led to the increasing operation of the MFIs. Further, in governmental schemes like the SGSY or the Urban Self-Employment Schemes, subsidies were linked to the ability of the SHGs to get loans from banks. The design of many of these schemes was such that applicants had to get their loans sanctioned before they could avail of even the inadequate and reduced subsidy (which in most cases did not exceed 35 per cent of the entire project). This was accompanied by inadequate infrastructural, training and marketing support for such employment opportunities. Thus, even though many of these schemes were targeted at the poorest of the poor (those below the poverty line), the rural and urban poor were not able to avail of these schemes adequately. For example, the government of Delhi was able to make only about 500 SHGs and train 3,000 women in one decade of its Shahri Swarozgar Yojana. Thus, along with other macro economic factors, the failure to provide work to the rural and urban poor also made them more and more vulnerable to the MFIs as well as informal sources of credit to meet their daily needs.
Need to Resist the Current Trend
The pressure being applied by the MFIs to resist the regulation should be seen in this context. Their political influence is reflected in the fact that the Andhra Pradesh Micro Finance Institutions (Regulation of Money Lending) Act (passed in December 2010) has no caps on interest rates. This once again shows that the government is willing to let the micro finance institutions do business as usual and manipulate the urban and rural poor for maximizing their profits. Needless to say, this trend needs to be countered and linked to the larger fight against neo-liberal policies and the increased social security for the urban and rural poor.
The democratic movement has been raising demands based on their experience with women’s SHGs and the government programs of the Left ruled states. It recognizes that the MFIs can only be countered if the government supports the SHGs through increased subsidies and low interest credits. The direct links of public sector banks with rural and urban poor and their SHGs need to be strengthened by expansion of the banking infrastructure and provisioning of low interest rate credit at a repayment rate of four percent. In such cases, the government may require to provide interest subsidies to these groups. But along with this, political mobilization for the regulation of the MFIs needs to be strengthened. For-profit NGOs and MFIs need to be stopped from expanding their operations in this sector on an urgent basis. It is no surprise that the finance minister has already stated that the government does not want to ‘strangulate’ the micro finance sector. The intention of the government is thus clear and large scale political mobilization is urgently required to stop its devious and anti-people design.
Wednesday, January 5, 2011
When techies turn teachers...
A bandhu they can bank on
The tiny drops promise to swell into an ocean of profit, as FINO handholds the poor to deposit their faith and money in the banking system.. |
For many of us who effortlessly shop for things, transfer money or pay utility bills with a click of the mouse, it is virtually impossible to even imagine the trauma the illiterate, the rural and the lower middle-classes face in doing these simple tasks. Mind you, these are not the abjectly poor; they make a decent income.
So, at the office of FINO (Financial Information and Networks Organisation) Ltd at Dharavi, touted as Asia's biggest slum, in Mumbai, the sense of empowerment was palpable as Sushma Devi walked in with her month-old baby in her arms, and her three-year-old daughter clutching her finger.
She proceeded to the counter where Shahida, a FINO banking correspondent or bandhu, was seated with a small hand-held device into which went the woman's biometric or smart card bearing her bank account details. The machine confirmed her identity after she placed her index finger on the monitor, and she put Rs 300 into her account. The money came from her husband's earnings and it was great to note that it went into the wife's bank account!
The transaction took barely a minute. Sunita Singh, who runs a small business nearby, came in next to deposit Rs 5,000 in the Union Bank of India account of one of her workers. “This money will be withdrawn by his parents living in a small town in UP. He sends them Rs 5,000 every month like this,” she said.
Arvind, a fruit seller, followed. He sells cut fruits on his handcart; “it is Ramzan, and in the evenings there is brisk business. I'm making good money, so I'm putting this (Rs 1,000) into my account before I spend it,” he grinned. This month has been good and he has already saved Rs 6,000.
Manish Khera, FINO's CEO, who in 2006 quit his secure job as a joint general manager at ICICI Bank, Mumbai, to set up the organisation, watches with quiet pride the efficient working of the system where money is either put in or withdrawn.
“We saw that banking in general is concentrated on the urban middle-class and we were not really serving the masses. And it was not even a niche bank.” The bulk of the customers living in remote places and the expensive physical infrastructure to reach them were major obstacles preventing such customers from engaging with banks.
He looked around at global initiatives to solve this problem; the Brazilian model of business correspondent (BC) was just taking off, and there were initiatives happening in South Africa and Indonesia.
So he zeroed in on the idea of the BC (today FINO has over 10,000); “instead of banks setting up branches, the agent or bandhu goes to the doorstep of the client and with little or shared physical infrastructure the business model becomes feasible.”
Government payouts
Over 90 per cent of FINO's 18.5 million clients are in rural India, and “as we talk, 50,000 additional clients will come in today,” he says.
The biggest component of FINO, which operates in 23 States and 80 districts, comprises Government payouts, social security pensions, health insurance for the BPL (RSBY or Rashtriya Swasthiya Bima Yojana) and NREGA. “In rich States such as Haryana and Punjab, where NREGA hasn't really taken off as the private players pay more, we execute social security pensions in a big way,” says Khera. The Haryana government pays a monthly old-age pension of Rs 700 to the BPL, and FINO has over one million of these customers.
But its biggest customer-base — 9 million — comes in the RSBY category, where the Government provides cashless insurance to people in the BPL category. The Government pays the premium and servicing is by private or public insurance companies. The annual cover is up to Rs 30,000. “Our job is to issue cards to the customer, install devices in hospitals where customers can get healthcare facilities using their smart cards. We provide the technology and the insurance company pays us for the service.”
Next comes NREGA with 5 million customers; the bulk in Andhra Pradesh, where FINO works well with the State government, followed by Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan. Those who earlier shunned NREGA work, either because of delayed payment or partial payment as the money was siphoned off, are getting into the FINO system as full payment is assured on the third day. With 1.5 million new NREGA customers every month, by the end of this financial year, the total will exceed 10 million.
Encouraging savings
So, is FINO encouraging the poor and the lower middle-classes to save?
Yes, “a subtle shift” is happening, he says. “With NREGA-like people being our larger customer base… earlier they used to get the money and spend it. Now, with a bank account they think they should retain a little money for times of need.”
On the recently started remittances model, mainly domestic and foreign on a pilot basis, he says that unlike in other money transfer systems, the advantage of a bank account is that beneficiaries don't have to withdraw all money at one go; some might even save a portion. Ultimately, when the banks see some money remaining in the account, they might offer them other financial products like loans. In domestic remittances, which average around Rs 5,000 a quarter, money goes from urban centres such as Mumbai, Delhi and Surat to villages in poorer States like Bihar, MP and Orissa which witness a lot of migration.
But are banks really interested in micro-customers dealing in tiny sums?
“Yes and no; today there is a systemic push on the banks to reach these people. Deputy RBI Governor Dr K.C. Chakraborty did a great thing by recently getting all banks to submit a formal financial inclusion plan approved by their boards. Having given something formally to the RBI which is being monitored, there is pressure on them to comply.”
He adds: “If you go into the maps of this business, it makes money. Only you have to be persistent, have a large base and the right products for the customers, so some banks are now also pursuing this as a profit motive, because though each customer brings very small sums, the aggregate value adds up.”
Like in Mumbai alone, FINO's daily cash collection is Rs 2 crore. The next step, says Khera, who hopes to come out with an IPO by 2013, is to convert his customers' smart card into “something like an India Card, which like Visa or MasterCard, can be used for purchases, paying utility bills etc. The possibilities are immense.”
FINO's first target is 25 million customers in five years. “We'll do that before the deadline, and our next milestone is 100 million in the following five years,” adds Khera.
Engaging the farm sector
The organisation, which recently won the Financial Times Sustainable Banking award in the ‘Achievement in Banking at Base of the Pyramid' category, is now forging a partnership with the farm sector. “We have opened bank accounts of all the farmers who supply milk to the NDDB. Along with a savings bank account they get bank loans and cattle insurance, all coupled in a single product.” It has started in Gujarat and UP and will expand to other States soon.
Verghese, who has a tiny watch repair shop in Dharavi, now banks on FINO to send his family in Kanyakumari a monthly allowance. “But I hope they will soon hel me get a loan to expand my business,” he says
At the FINO office, Arvind, the fruit seller, completes his transaction and says, “This is so much quicker than a bank, where you have to first fill a form, take a token and then wait for the sahibs to return from their coffee break! And then they'll tell us ‘ aaj computer me gadbad hei!' (Today the computer is not working.)”
I next watch Pervez withdraw the entire amount of Rs 17,400 from his SB account for expenses related to his brother's wedding. Arun Mandal, a civil works supervisor, comes in to send Rs 3,000 to his parents in Jharkhand.
But what brings tears to the eye is 16-year-old Pintu Kumar, who works as an electrician in Mumbai, sending Rs 2,000 to his parents at Satsena village in UP. “I left my school two years ago to come here; my boss taught me the work and I'm happy to send money regularly to my parents from here,” he says cheerfully.
Source:-FINO
Potential of financial literacy
In India, financial literacy is seen as an adjunct to the financial inclusion exercise. However, its role in addressing the aspirations of an emerging economy deserves recognition.
Tanushree Mazumdar
At a recently held workshop on financial literacy, organised by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), it was interesting to note that even developed countries were grappling with the issue.
There was, however, a difference in the thrust of financial literacy/education drives in these countries vis-Ã -vis developing countries like India. So far, in India, the emphasis has largely been on financially educating the rural poor and illiterate. Whether it is the business correspondent/business facilitator (BC/BF) model or the technology-driven banking model that the regulators and banks are currently encouraging, the main focus remains the rural poor.
These models have a two-pronged focus: include the financially excluded in the mainstream financial system and financially educate the rural masses about banks, their products, services, procedures, and so on.
In developed countries (OECD to be precise), there is greater focus on educating an average family — helping it balance its budget, build assets, save for children's education and retirement planning. Financial literacy there takes the form of guiding consumers through the maze of complex financial products, taking confident financial decisions and safeguarding their financial interests, and resisting marketing pitches of financial companies by asking the right questions.
There is another difference in the objectives of financial education programmes in the developed and developing countries. In the developed countries, financial literacy is linked to consumer protection.. Better information disclosure, they believe, would go a long way in strengthening regulatory standards for consumer protection.
In India, financial literacy is seen as a means to achieve financial inclusion. The thrust is on rural areas. This is not surprising, given that 5.7 lakh out of the six-lakh villages don't have a bank branch. There is, however, a strong case for extending the efforts of financial inclusion to urban areas as well. The Economic Survey 2009-10, quoting the NSS 61 {+s} {+t} Round, says that poverty ratio in urban areas is 25.7 per cent which is only somewhat lower than the 28.3 per cent poverty ratio in rural areas.
LIVELIHOOD NEEDS
What will help financial inclusion is not financial literacy per se but linking people's livelihood needs with banking services. For example, the Aryavrat Gramin Bank in Uttar Pradesh achieved 100 per cent financial inclusion in some hamlets in UP through its tie-up with a corporate to sell solar powered lamps. The Kisan Mitra Scheme of Punjab National Bank achieved 100 per cent financial inclusion in 40 villages by linking bank finance to farming needs.
There is also the example of a pilot project in Warangal district of Andhra Pradesh, where pension payments and payments under NREGS were made through direct credit to bank accounts.
If people need banks for saving or receiving income or for remittances or loans they will avail of such banking services. In such cases, financial literacy becomes only the catalyst and not the main driving force behind financial inclusion.
Financial literacy can achieve a larger goal: that of empowering the consumer to take financial decisions confidently. And it need not be restricted to rural areas.
Urban areas in India may not be too different from developed countries in terms of the aspirations of people and the challenges they face. Some lessons from OECD countries can then be drawn for our own financial literacy programme.
Countries such as Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines include financial education as a part of school education. Money sense (like civic sense) is best inculcated in people as early as possible. The pilot project in Karnataka where financial education is being implemented in schools is a good step, and the outcome of the project will help in the strategising of financial education and roll-out in other States.
LITERACY STRATEGIES
In New Zealand, as a part of its financial literacy strategy, topics have been classified into three levels: everyday (financial products, services, inflation, etc.), occasional (wills, mortgage, etc.) and specialist (derivatives, portfolio management, etc.). We could think of a financial literacy strategy along similar lines.
Delivery of financial literacy is going to be the greatest challenge in India, not the least because of its geographical spread and diversity in languages. Just as banks have started offering credit counselling services, some authority has to take the responsibility of offering financial counselling. This cannot be left to the banks or other financial institutions, because there could be a conflict of interest.
Besides, financial counselling would involve, among other things, providing at one place, information about products and their charges across all banks, mutual funds, insurance companies, and so on. A centralised/impartial authority has to take charge of this task to assure uniformity in delivery and credibility of content.
May be, this is something that the proposed Financial Stability and Development Council can think about. After all, lack of financial education is said to be at the bottom of the recent global crisis and financial instability.